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Abstract 
The incorporation of restorative justice (RJ) into penal policy is not a neutral process; it 
actually re-shapes both the rationales and the functioning of RJ, possibly erasing its 
potential to be something ‘other’ and ‘better’ than criminal justice. Through a comparative 
analysis of policy on RJ in England and Wales, Norway and France, this paper claims that 
RJ’s promise to provide a cooperative-transformative approach to social conflicts and 
harms, predicated on de-professionalisation, direct stakeholders’ centrality and critique of 
punishment, is neutralised by the process of translating RJ into penal policy. The second 
part of the paper sketches out RJ as a critique of violence, outside any legal framework. 
Along these lines, it is possible to generate original insights into the current situation and 
future developments of RJ and, more broadly, into the corrosive dynamics of legal violence. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I reflect on the incorporation of restorative justice (RJ) into penal policy, as a 
stage in the wider phenomenon of institutionalising RJ. I contend that this process 
necessarily obliterates RJ’s promise to provide a cooperative-transformative approach to 
social conflicts and harms predicated on de-professionalisation, direct stakeholders’ 
centrality and critique of punishment. I make this case by analysing some examples of the 
inclusion of RJ into penal policy, drawn from England and Wales, Norway and France. My 
point is that penal policy, by imposing on RJ the recognition of the state – understood as a 
hierarchical social relation and not only as a complex institutional body – sterilises RJ’s 
potential to be something substantively different and ‘better’ than criminal justice. When 
RJ endorses and enforces the state, in fact, it turns into a largely conservative and subtly 
punitive form of social control. In the final section of this work, drawing on Walter Benjamin, 
Jacques Rancière and Saul Newman, I sketch out some implications of my argument, 
generating insights into the possible development of a radical, non-institutionalised RJ. 
Background 
The expression ‘restorative justice’ here refers to three conceptually distinct but empirically 
overlapping objects: (1) a justice reform movement emerging in the 1970s in the Western 
world and then spreading globally, advocating for a (2) largely non-punitive and 




voluntary encounters between direct stakeholders, geared toward addressing those harms 
and their consequences (cf. Marshall, 1999). This movement has taken different forms in 
different geographical/historical contexts, modifying its ethos in response to changing 
political and social circumstances, and advocating for different practices, determining the 
empirical complexity of the RJ field.  
In spite of such a diversity, the RJ movement has often hailed the transformation of RJ into 
a penal policy option as a normatively desirable stage in the institutionalisation of this 
approach (e.g. Walgrave, 2000; Braithwaite, 2002; Van Ness and Strong, 2002; London, 
2010). This is because policy supposedly ensures the wide and deep development of RJ, in 
terms of implementation, funding and capacity. At the same time, the development of 
policy on RJ, over the last thirty years in the Western world, has been relentless (Poama, 
2015). This process has been studied widely. 
Aertsen, Daems and Robert’s edited collection (2006) on the institutionalisation of RJ has 
richly described dangers and opportunities related to the interaction between the multiple 
ideologies underlying RJ and its policy implementation, as well as the relationships between 
centralised institutionalisation and the current transformations of contemporary Western 
states. The overall picture emerging from this work emphasises the risks of sterilising the 
transformative potential of RJ due to the conflicting values underpinning criminal justice 
and RJ. In fact, as Pavlich (2005) has argued, RJ is often situated within criminal justice 
systems and increasingly tends to serve, and to be measured by, criminal justice objectives 
such as offender rehabilitation, compliance or reoffending rates, and less by the goals of 
repairing the harm or meeting victim needs. In a similar vein, Woolford and Ratner (2007) 
have expounded the limits of the formalisation of RJ describing how informal conflict 
resolution strategies (e.g. RJ) are articulated and then co-opted by state-based formal 
apparatuses. RJ, insofar as it is funded by the public bodies and endorses legal mindsets, 
strengthens juridical structures instead of problematising their premises, forms and effects. 
From an empirical perspective, Crawford and Newburn (2003) have investigated the 
incorporation of RJ within the English and Welsh youth justice, generating precious insights 
into the institutionalisation of RJ. Looking at the transformations involving the youth justice 
system in England and Wales during the early 2000s, they have questioned the purported 
shift from an ‘exclusionary punitive justice’ to an ‘inclusionary restorative justice’ (Crawford 
and Newburn, 2003: 2). The main issue, here, is that the application of RJ principles has 
been halted by the limited stakeholders’ participation, mainly due to the legal tools used to 
implement RJ as well as by the managerial nature of the Anglo-Welsh youth justice system.  
This perspective resonates with Johnstone’s claim (2011) that institutionalising RJ equates 
with turning RJ practices into professionalised processes, characterised by uniformity, lack 
of creativity, centralisation, and as such unable to give conflicts back to communities. 
Similarly, Christie’s late critical reflections on the cooptation of RJ (2013, 2015) have raised 
the specific issue of the language of RJ within policy (2013) which manifestly overlaps with 
‘conventional’ criminal justice language (e.g. dichotomy victim/offender). The issue at stake 
is whether the institutional developments of RJ deliver or betray this ‘new’ paradigm’s 
ambitious promises, highlighting the implicit dangers in turning RJ into a mainstream penal 
policy option. 
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Differently from these sociologically-oriented explorations, von Hirsch et al. (2003) have 
advanced a number of legal-philosophical understandings of the translation of RJ into 
policy/legal frameworks critically discussing the underlying aims, values and limits of RJ in 
light of traditional conceptions, principles and values of criminal law and justice. They have 
stressed as overarching points, the controversial relationships between RJ, penal 
punishment/retribution and current penal policy, calling for a critical assessment of the 
incorporation of RJ into criminal justice from the perspective of both victims and offenders’ 
rights. 
Preliminary definitions and approach 
The literature on the institutionalisation of RJ addresses the transformation of RJ into actual 
programs, often with a reformist aim (cf. Pali and Pelikan, 2015), focussing on the 
compatibility of RJ with general principles of law, from a socio-legal or legal-philosophical 
standpoint. This paper can be situated within the latter strand of the literature, with the 
proviso that it is informed by a radical anti-authoritarian (anarchist) approach (Newman, 
2010, 2016). From this perspective, in the following pages, I reflect on how the 
incorporation of RJ into penal policy (namely into penal laws) neutralises RJ’s most 
progressive aspects, that is, its radical core.  
By ‘core’ I do not intend some essential and immutable values driving RJ. Instead, I refer to 
one component of the fluid set of principles advocated by the RJ movement. By ‘radical’ I 
designate those values relating to RJ as a non-violent approach to social conflict and harms. 
Although such a ‘core’ is not unanimously shared by RJ advocates, scholars and 
practitioners, it does have a long history within this field and it is widely known, discussed 
and sometimes used to inform RJ campaigns and practices (Johnstone and Ward, 2010; 
Ryan and Ward, 2015). Nevertheless, these radical values constitute a rather unstable 
object, continuously revised and enriched by those involved in the practice and theory of 
RJ, making my analysis necessarily a partial sketch.  
In order to address the institutionalisation of this radical core, I provide a critical scrutiny of 
a range of policy documents on RJ. Clearly, policy is just one dimension of the 
institutionalisation of RJ (Faget, 2006). This process, in fact, entails how policy texts are re-
intepreted by professionals and an array of stakeholders, through a thick fabric of micro-
social transactions. RJ practitioners are not mere passive ‘policy enforcers’, they creatively 
adjust regulations to their organisational culture or individual values. My contention, 
however, is that this should not suggest a meek acceptance of the regulation of RJ, 
burdening practitioners with the promethean task of enfranchising RJ from the shackles 
tentatively imposed by the state. For this reason, in this paper, I am concerned with policy 
texts in their own right, focussing on what gets silenced or emphasised and possibly why, 
within them. This can open up spaces for critical engagement with both recent institutional 
developments of RJ and with strands in the literature and advocacy which support the 
incorporation of RJ into penal policy (e.g. Walgrave, 2000, 2008; Braithwaite, 2002; Van 
Ness and Strong, 2002; London, 2010). 
The analysis considers three case studies selected for two different reasons. Firstly, they 




civil law (France) and mixed (Norway). Secondly, the incorporation of RJ in these three 
countries has followed different historical trajectories: well-established (Norway and 
England and Wales) and recent (France). Such legal/historical diversity enables a reflection 
on the overarching patterns of the policy regulation of RJ, presenting some generalisable 
implications with respect to this process.  
There are two main limitations to my analysis. Firstly, this work is a theoretical elaboration 
on a large set of policy material and as such tends to be broad ranging. However, my primary 
goal is to reconstruct patterns across the representations of RJ in policy (Garland, 2001: viii) 
and, from this perspective, a degree of generalisation is inevitable. Additionally, this ‘whole 
picture approach’ enables a good degree of heuristic productivity (Garland, 2001; Pavlich, 
2005). Secondly, the inferences from policy are always underdetermined and theory-laden, 
i.e. many readings of the same data are possible. My interpretations are led by the intention 
of pointing out some normative inconsistencies in the RJ literature and a direction for 
further critical research, offering an analytical perspective which seeks to raise questions 
whilst considering their implications rather than dispensing answers (cf. Maglione, 2019a; 
2019b). 
The radical core 
De-professionalisation, direct stakeholders’ centrality, critique of the crime/punishment 
dyad and a cooperative-transformative approach to social conflicts and harms constitute 
the radical core of RJ (Johnstone and Ward, 2010; Ryan and Ward, 2015).  
De-professionalisation entails the systematic deskilling of professional positions in the area 
of responding to conflicts (including those expressed as ‘crimes’). This process occurs when 
non-qualified or less-qualified individuals (e.g. volunteer laypeople) are used to perform 
work which historically was executed by qualified subjects such as lawyers and judges. This 
is a theme epitomised by Christie’s penal minimalism, widely considered a reference point 
for the RJ movement worldwide (Johnstone, 2011; Van Ness and Strong, 2002). The now 
classic ‘Conflict as Property’ (Christie, 1977) has often been used by RJ practitioners, 
scholars and advocates as a conceptual reservoir upon which to draw the normative 
infrastructure of RJ. The conceptualisation of crimes as social conflicts stolen/reframed by 
professional (legal experts) and structural (social systems) thieves, feeds in the idea of 
limiting experts’ monopoly in dealing with social conflicts. 
This point directly links with the idea of involving direct stakeholders in dealing with their 
own conflicts. Christie (1977) argued that conflicts are precious resources which belong to 
the subjects personally involved, as well as their social networks, emphasising community-
based conflict handling as an opportunity for norm-clarification.  
In a similar vein, Zehr’s work, considered a milestone for the development of RJ worldwide 
(Johnstone, 2011; Van Ness and Strong, 2002), has strongly emphasised the key role of 
direct stakeholders in RJ as one of the distinctive differences with respect to traditional 
criminal justice (Zehr, 2005). The focus on decentralisation, investment on community and 
ostracism toward a state-based approach to crimes is highly characteristic of Zehr’s 
proposal. Stakeholders should be active participants in the process of addressing the 
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criminal behaviour, due to their ‘direct’ (i.e. personal) stake in the crime and its aftermath. 
Here, emphasis is placed on reducing the role of the state in dealing with harm and 
wrongdoing. Hence, community-based measures can positively address the human 
repercussions of conflicts, letting stakeholders regain control over their lives. 
The critique of the crime/punishment dyad has traversed the RJ movement since its 
inception (Ruggiero, 2011). There is a stream in RJ theory which refers to a form of 
conceptual abolitionism (following Hulsman (1986)), seeking to liberate our ways of coping 
with those troublesome events sometimes called ‘crimes’ in order to make interventions 
more socially informed and thereby more organic (Sullivan and Tifft, 2001). By challenging 
the concept of ‘crime’, and by speaking of ‘problematic events’, ‘conflicts’ or ‘harms’ 
instead, it is possible to produce an alternative to the fundamentally violent social control 
model of crime-and-punishment. Restorative practices, in light of this, would address 
responsively social harms caused through unique interactions (‘conflict’) between two or 
more individuals (Woolford, 2009: 29). 
The cooperative-transformative approach to conflicts and harms is also a key aspect of the 
radical core (cf. Bianchi, 1994). Because so many feel alienated from the criminal justice 
system, RJ would enable people to experience justice as supportive of their lives and their 
social interactions through non-punitive solutions, adapting structures and models from 
conflict mediation and negotiation. However, problematic situations, conflicts and harms 
are not just a result of interpersonal violence, but often of ‘social structural violence, that 
is, violence done to people through [...] hierarchical social arrangements’ (Sullivan and Tifft, 
2001: 43). For this reason, RJ should not confine its attention to developing practices 
targeting conventionally defined – that is, defined by those who have significant cultural, 
social, political and economic capital – acts of injustice. Rather, it is necessary to address 
the social conditions which reproduce harm, inequality and violence. From this perspective, 
RJ should include aims such as recasting conflicts and harms as political matters, creating 
communities and denouncing precarity, along the lines of gender, ethnicity and socio-
economic status (Hudson, 1998; Blagg, 2017; Maglione, 2018). This position complements 
the preliminary critique of criminal justice as based on violence and oppression, showing 
how criminal justice fails to account for how the larger social system contributes to what is 
defined as ‘crime’ (Pepinsky and Quinney, 1991).  
Overall, these multiple aims and values configure RJ as a non-violent justice, that is, a 
framework to imagine ways to reckon with the ambivalences of social relations without 
resorting to punishment (understood as a deliberate infliction of pain), that is, without 
reactivating the cycle of violence, whilst supporting people’s capacity to own their social 
conflicts and harms.  









England and Wales 
In England and Wales early policy on ‘reparation’ activities involving ‘offenders’ and 
‘victims’ date back to New Labour1 governments in the 1990s, namely the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 and the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, followed up more 
recently by The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
(Liebman, 2007). 
The New Labour flagship Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduces at §67 the ‘Reparation 
Order for youth offenders’ (aged 10-17), paving the way for the institutionalisation of RJ in 
England and Wales. As the Guidance Document states, these orders aim to provide 
the courts with a new disposal to help prevent further offending by bringing 
home to young offenders the consequences of their behaviour and enabling 
them to make amends, as appropriate, to their victims or the wider 
community (1998: 2.1). 
Reparation orders can be given before or after a court prescribes a non-custodial sentence 
and have to be commensurate to the sentence; they are carried out under supervision and 
do not require consent of the ‘offender’ but just of the ‘victim’. In case of breach, the court 
may impose more restrictive consequences such as a curfew, an attendance order or the 
sentence which would have been given if the reparation order had not been made. In a 
similar vein, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 regulates the ‘Referral Order’ 
and ‘Youth Offender Panels’ (1999: §8). The conditions for receiving this order are to plead 
guilty and the absence of previous convictions. Additionally, it requires the offender’s 
consent to a contract (‘Youth Offender Contract’) of rehabilitative and restorative elements 
to be drafted through a multi-agency panel and completed within the sentence. These 
measures resonate with the ‘Youth Rehabilitation Order’ created by Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008. This measure can include 
activity whose purpose is that of reparation, such as an activity involving 
contact between an offender and persons affected by the offences in respect 
of which the order was made (2008: §2.8.2).  
Rehabilitation orders can be given to persons aged under 18 convicted of an offence, by the 
court by or before they are convicted and can include a reparation requirement which, if 
breached, involves the revocation of the order. As for adults, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
regulates a key statutory instrument for the development of RJ, that is, the ‘Conditional 
Caution’ (2003: §22). As the Crown Prosecution Conditional Cautioning Code (2010) 
explains, the key aspect of this instrument is the imposition of specified conditions as an 
appropriate and effective means of addressing an offender’s behaviour and RJ, here, ‘may 
be used to help determine the conditions to be attached to a Conditional Caution’ (2010: 
7.7) or can be ‘a condition of the caution itself’ (2010: 7.8). A conditional caution requires 
 
1 New Labour’ refers to a period in the history of the British Labour Party from the mid-1990s until 
2010, under the leadership of Tony Blair (Prime Minister between 1997 and 2007) and Gordon 
Brown (Prime Minister between 2007 and 2010). 
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the admission of responsibility for the offence whilst the failure to comply may result in the 
person being prosecuted for the offence. 
From the 2010s, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat2 coalition’s policy on RJ appeared to 
strengthen the focus on the responsibilisation of offenders and the satisfaction of 
(idealised) victims. A relevant example, here, is the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which 
regulates pre-sentencing RJ (2013: schedule 16.2). It states that the court can defer 
sentence in order to have regard to the offender’s conduct after conviction, and within this 
context it can impose a ‘Restorative Justice Requirement’.  
This is an activity 
(a) where the participants consist of, or include, the offender and one or more 
of the victims, (b) which aims to maximise the offender’s awareness of the 
impact of the offending concerned on the victims, and (c) which gives an 
opportunity to a victim or victims to talk about [...] the offending and its 
impact (2013: schedule 16.2). 
 
In terms of conditions, the RJ requirement includes  
in addition to the offender’s consent [...] the consent of every other person 
who would be a participant in the activity concerned (2013: schedule 16.2). 
 
Finally, the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 establishes a form of post-sentencing RJ (2014: 
§15.3.8). It states that within the ‘Rehabilitation Activity Requirement’ it is to be considered 
‘restorative’ any action if  
(a) the participants consist of, or include, the offender and one or more of the 
victims, (b) the aim of the activity is to maximise the offender’s awareness of 
the impact of the offending concerned on the victims, and (c) the activity gives 
a victim or victims an opportunity to talk about, or by other means express 
experience of, the offending and its impact. 
 
Norway 
Norway has an established tradition of alternative measures to criminal prosecution, with 
a pioneering legislation on mediation introduced in 1991. The national mediation service 
(‘Konfliktrådet’) handles both civil and criminal cases, ‘restoratively’ (The Mediation Service 
Act 1991: §1), that is, aiming to enable the parties and others concerned by an offense or a 
conflict to jointly decide, helped by non-professional mediators, how its effects should be 
handled (Dale and Hydle, 2008). The legislation affords a statutory basis for mediation as 
well as powers to make referrals to mediation and to discontinue criminal proceedings. Such 
 




a ‘mediation’ is an independent criminal sanction, included in the Code of Criminal 
Proceedings. Legislation introduced in 2004 transferred responsibility for organising 
mediation from municipal authorities to 22 public mediation services, run directly by the 
Ministry of Justice3. 
The Mediation Service Act 1991 was significantly amended in 2014 through the introduction 
of the ‘Youth Monitoring and Follow-up’ measure (2014: § 1). This is a criminal sanction for 
young people (between 15 and 18 years) who have not committed serious or repeated 
crimes (in this latter case the new Mediation Service Act establishes a different measure, 
the ‘Youth Punishment’) aiming to prevent reoffending (Holmboe, 2017). It may be applied 
after a decision made by a prosecutor or a court and requires the young person’s consent 
(along with their relevant guardian’s). Its length will be no more than one year and will 
contain specific activity requirements to be fulfilled by the young person. The activity 
requirements which substantiate this measure are decided during a ‘conference’ (2014: § 
1) and organised as a ‘plan’ which will be implemented through specific monitoring and 
follow-up multi-agency work. With the establishment of this new measure also a new 
professional figure – ‘Youth coordinators’ (2014: § 3) – is created. The coordinator sets up 
the conference and, at least once a month, meets with the young person and the monitoring 
team. Coordinators can also make direct decisions affecting the young person’s freedom, 
such as prohibit the use of ‘alcohol or other intoxicating or narcotic substances’ (2014: § 
28). 
The ‘Youth Monitoring and Follow-up’ is explicitly described as based on the principles of RJ 
(‘gjennoprettenderett’) (2014: § 1), here mainly expressed by the ‘voluntary’ 
responsibilisation of the young offender. During a conference, in fact, the young person 
faces the consequences of their behaviours and hears about the damage caused. Also, for 
the ‘victim’ (whose participation is optional), such a meeting is said to have a good effect in 
terms of processing the incident and reducing anxiety (Jørgensen, 2015). As mentioned 
above, during the conference, the young person together with the coordinator and 
representatives from the police, prisons, schools, family services, child and adolescent 
networks, drafts a plan with specific requirements. These professionals constitute the 
monitoring team that follows up the young person throughout the implementation period 
and ensures both control and assistance. If the young person violates the requirements, a 
new plan is established, with stricter controls and closer monitoring. Multiple violations may 
finally result in the prosecutor resuming criminal prosecution (Jørgensen, 2015). 
France 
The development of RJ in France has been considered as slow, if compared to other 
neighbouring European countries (Bonafe-Schmitt, 2013; Cario, 2007). However, practices 
of informal criminal justice (i.e. penal mediation) have a long history here (see Code of Penal 
Proceedings (CPP), 2014: §41-1). Regulations on material reparation of damages caused by 
the crime are also well established in the French criminal justice system (see Law 2000-516).  
 
3 Children under the age of 15 (the age of criminal responsibility in Norway) cannot be referred for 
criminal mediation but may be referred to the civil mediation process. 
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Traditionally, in France, penal mediation was set as a measure independent of the RJ 
theoretical framework. This measure was, and still is, decided by the prosecutor as a form 
of diversion from prosecution, as long as the facts are acknowledged by the offender (so 
called ‘plaider coupable’ principle), for a range of ‘minor crimes’ (CPP, 2014: §§ 41-1, 41-2 
and 41-3). The mediator (police officer, a delegated professional or a mediator of the 
prosecutor) facilitates the reparation of the damage caused to the victim, with a view to 
stop offending and reoffending, also by drafting an enforceable agreement (based on 
parties’ will) which however does not entail updating the criminal record.  
A relevant change in this context was introduced in 2014 by the Law 2014-896 on the 
‘Individualisation of punishment and strengthening the effectiveness of penal sanctions’ 
(enforcing the EU Directive 29/12 on Victims’ Rights) which notably modified both the CPP 
and the Penal Code (PC) with respect to victims’ rights. This law establishes the possibility 
for any person who is ‘victim’ or ‘offender’ to be proposed RJ (‘justice restauratrice’) at any 
stage of a criminal proceeding4. The general aim pursued is assigning a more central role to 
the victim within criminal justice (PC, 2014: §130-1). From this perspective, this law creates 
the right to obtain, at any stage of the criminal justice process, including the execution of 
the sentence, the ‘reparation of the consequences of crime’ which may involve 
‘compensation’ and ‘any other suitable measure including the possibility to offer a 
restorative justice measure’ (CPP, 2014: §10-2.1), to both ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’. 
This law also introduces a new penal sanction – the penal restraint (‘contrainte pénale’) – 
which is conceived of as the suitable legal framework within which to propose a restorative 
measure. This is a type of community punishment consisting in a range of obligations and 
interdictions under supervision, for the offender aged above 18 and who has committed a 
crime whose statutory punishment is not more than five years of prison. This measure’s 
justification is preventing reoffending by facilitating social reintegration (see Mouhanna, 
2017). The length of the restraint is between six months and five years and includes a range 
of obligations such as to repair the consequences of the crime, the prohibition to encounter 
the victim and to undertake some training. In case of breach, the offender will be put in 
prison for the length of the remaining restraint. One of the activities which can be 
undertaken as a condition of the penal restraint is RJ. The §10-1.2 establishes as 
requirements for the proposal of a restorative intervention the ‘recognition of the facts’ 
and both parties’ ‘explicit consent’ after being ‘properly informed’ about the restorative 
process. The definition of a restorative measure is ‘any measure which enables a victim as 
well as an offender to participate actively in the resolution of the difficulties arising by the 
crime, and especially the reparation of any negative consequence arising from the crime’ 
(CPP, 2014: §10-1). The restorative measure is arranged by a trained and independent party 
under judicial control or, when the measure takes place during the execution of a custodial 
sentence, of the prison administration. 
 
 
4 See Ministère de la Justice ‘Rapport sur la mise en oeuvre de la loi du 15 août 2014 relative à 





There are historical, legal and conceptual differences across the three examples of policy 
incorporation of RJ briefly analysed above. However, there are also significant 
commonalities which pertain to the basic aspects of the translation of RJ into a penal 
measure. 
Criminal justice language  
In England and Wales, France and Norway the language used to regulate RJ is fundamentally 
the ‘conventional’ criminal justice5 language. The dichotomy victim/offender is a 
paradigmatic example. In penal policy one is either a ‘victim’ or an ‘offender’, there is no 
room for (social, personal, cultural) overlaps between those two positions. The idea of a 
person who is at the same time harmed but also harming, does not seem compatible with 
the idea of RJ underpinning the policy analysed above. Instead, institutionalised RJ revolves 
around idealised images of crime stakeholders mirroring criminal justice actors (Christie, 
1986). The ‘victim’ appears as disempowered and vulnerable whilst the ‘offender’ is 
presented as the harm-maker/wrongdoer neatly separated from their victim. The ‘crime’ 
can be considered a further example. The idea of harms or conflicts rooted in e.g. social 
inequality is completely overwritten by the simplifying criminal justice label of ‘crime’. 
These linguistic choices are expressions of deep-seated values. RJ enshrined in legislation 
embraces a functionalist understanding of crime (Walgrave, 2017: 97). Crime is an individual 
pathology which needs to be neutralised. RJ aspires to ‘cure’ this pathology, ‘maximising 
the offender’s responsibility’, whilst neglecting both the emancipatory potential of 
transgressions of established legal frameworks and the unbalanced power relations which 
contribute toward the definition of behaviours as crimes. Additionally, the use of the 
criminal justice language is a crucial condition for ‘mainstreaming’ (O’Mahony and 
Campbell, 2006), or ‘flat-pack[ing]’ (Blagg, 2017) RJ. The centralised regulation, in fact, 
requires a focussing on serving conventional justice goals, such as reducing reoffending or 
increasing efficiency, by lowering costs and speeding up the process. This standardised 
language also enables the development of an evidence-based, ‘tick the box’ approach to 
justice interventions. This may have culturally colonising effects, considering that, through 
policy transfer, RJ programmes are often sold as a ‘standardised, homogenised commodity’ 
to non-western communities (Blagg, 2017: 71). 
Absent communities and ever-present criminal justice gatekeepers 
Policy representations of RJ consistently define the community as a collection of 
professionals who play a supporting role with respect to the key stakeholders (i.e. ‘victims’, 
‘offenders’ and criminal justice representatives). This is particularly the case of youth 
offender panels in England and Wales and of the new Norwegian youth conference. These 
meetings involve the youth offender’s ‘professional network’ and possibly (but not 
necessarily) the victim and their network. In this way, the ‘communitarian’ elements are 
 
5 This is a shorthand expression which refers to the legal rationality developed in the Western world 
since the Enlightenment, centered on individual responsibility, justified in the name of public order, 
implemented by public bodies and including the possibility of the deliberate infliction of pain on the 
offender, justified by retributivist and/or reductivist aims.  
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apparently saved, insofar as the relevant specialist micro-communities are engaged. 
However, to reduce the ‘community’ in RJ to the sheer presence of social workers and police 
officers is problematic, from the radical core’s perspective. The aspect which qualifies this 
‘third’ stakeholder should be its contribution towards avoiding the risk of privatising 
punishment and centering the process only on the stakeholders’ agency. The measures 
analysed, instead, appear led by trained practitioners, and an array of other experts (‘civil 
servants of moral orthopaedic’ as Michel Foucault would call them (1977: 10)), leaving little 
room for any form of active social participation that RJ should safely provide. 
From a procedural viewpoint, the policy regulations on RJ consistently require the 
offender’s admission of responsibility/plea of guilty. This could be considered as a form of 
endorsement of the criminalisation processes led by criminal justice gatekeepers. The idea 
of RJ following the standard criminal justice’s selective enforcement of offences and 
offenders, is a paradigmatic example of RJ being ‘defined in’ (Mathiesen, 2015) criminal 
justice. There is no chance (and no aspiration) to challenge police and prosecutors involved 
in screening discretionally harms and conflicts. In short, RJ works fundamentally as a penal 
mechanism. This means that it is about administering the consequences of an alleged/crime 
whose individual responsibility has been unambiguously pre-decided. Additionally, ‘penal’ 
refers to a distinctive understanding of social relations: dichotomic (victim vs. offender), 
focussed on personality more than systems, on acts more than interactions, on blame-
allocation more than on conflict resolution (Hulsman, 1986).  
Professionalisation, net widening and coercion 
Some regulations analysed above (especially the Norwegian ones) also entail the 
professionalisation of practitioners, i.e. the creation of a new ad hoc professional category 
which specialises in dealing with people’s crimes in a ‘restorative’ way. Restorative 
practitioners (e.g. the coordinator of the Norwegian youth conference) are new experts 
with power of control both over the participants during the restorative encounter and 
during the execution of the agreement/plan (e.g. youth follow-up plan) reached during the 
encounter. As Christie sharply noticed ‘The coordinator becomes a judge, a social worker 
and a police person in one role. There is not much room left for lay people’ (2015: 111). 
A further element to consider is the net widening potential of professionalising RJ. As said 
above, RJ is thought of as a diversionary measure/standalone penal option run by external 
professionals and targeting minor crimes. This may ‘functionalise’ RJ services to deal with a 
range of cases which would/could not be dealt with by state agencies due to their ‘minor’ 
nature, at least from a legal perspective (Cohen, 1985). 
The policy versions of RJ could easily be bent to coercion. The restorative caution lends itself 
to police pressure especially on first time youth offenders, insofar as it could be seen as a 
form of street-level responsibilisation (Crawford and Newburn, 2003). The Norwegian 
measure yields a relatively invasive control over the young person, who may be required to 
take alcohol or drug tests as part of the agreed plan. The French penal restraint actualises 
the idea of RJ as a low-threshold and informal punishment backed up by the possibility of 
being referred back to the standard track of prosecution-adjudication-sentencing-




principles, by locating itself (as an alternative) within the criminal justice system’ (Moore 
and Roberts, 2016: 130) ends up re-producing a subtle form of coercion. 
Making sense 
Penal policy systematically constructs RJ as a sui generis penal mechanism which 
emphasises the responsibilisation of the ‘offender’ and idealises the ‘victim’, whilst 
eliminating any space for conflict resolution or transformation. RJ appears then as ‘defined 
in’ criminal justice (Mathiesen, 2015), administratively incorporated in the criminal justice 
system, a paradoxical ‘better’ punishment (Pavlich, 2005). 
Clearly, these versions of RJ are inconsistent with the radical core described above. My 
contention, here, is that there is a constitutive – ontological – incompatibility between 
penal policy and the radical core of RJ. This implies that no ‘better’ penal policy will ever be 
able to embody those radical principles.  
The main root of this constitutive gap is how penal policy ‘parcels out’ social reality. The 
‘symbolic constitution of the social’ (Rancière, 2004) integral to penal policy, in fact, consists 
of essentialist binary oppositions (law-breaker/law-abiding, offender/victim, 
guilty/innocent) linked to individual categories (responsibility, subject, intent, motives) 
which downplay the role of social, cultural, economic and political interactions in shaping 
human relations (De Lagasnerie, 2018: 99). This individualising narrative is justified in the 
name of abstract social concepts such as public order and public interest (cf. Schürmann, 
2019: 26), i.e. floating signifiers articulated according to the culture, interests and biases of 
those who are meant to enforce them. Penal policy ‘sees’ crimes as exceptional behaviours 
committed by morally imperfect individuals and responds to them by expelling the crime 
and correcting the felon (Coyle, 2018; cf. Girard, 2013: 17). This also entails, in a time of 
neoliberal penality, the use of this sovereign narrative as a tool to expand the penal 
apparatus to deal with (and shore up) social inequality (Harcourt, 2010). 
Policy pre-sets such categories and forces people to take them up, creating ‘one size fits all’ 
identities, whilst making invisible and inaudible those whose positions are incompatible 
with this partitioning. In this way, this ‘parcelling out’ depoliticises people’s needs and 
claims (Rancière, 2010). Penal policy would not be policy without such a partitioning of the 
world, that is, without including what can be controlled and excluding what cannot be 
captured by those neat labels. This is because it aims to render the social world ‘legible’ and 
this is possible only by simplifications which are always instrumental, standardised, static 
(Scott, 1998: 80) and as such fictitious and violent.  
Taking a further step back, it is possible to read these epistemic-political operations as 
expressions of the state.  
By ‘state’ I do not simply intend the public bodies (policymakers, police, prosecutors, etc.) 
on which institutionalised RJ depends, but a type of social relation (Landauer in Lunn, 1973: 
226) whose reach informs and yet exceeds those public agencies. ‘State’ is any social bond 
which reaches a stage of non-transitivity, that is, highly unbalanced and hardly negotiable, 
drawing a line between ‘who dominates’ and ‘who is dominated’. 
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From an ontological viewpoint, this relation rests on the primacy of unification over 
multiplicity (Clastres, 2010: 274). Social practices (e.g. the definition of ‘victim’ or ‘offender’) 
are thought of as natural entities characterised by permanence, homogeneity and stability 
(Newman, 2010) carved out of the social world. This feature ties in with a certain 
epistemological viewpoint, whereby the state is marked by the idea that objective truth 
(e.g. the guilty plea or verdict’s ‘truth’) exists and is achievable. Anthropologically, this 
relation is characterised by a fixed idea of subjectivity (e.g. law-breakers as a type of human 
being) backed up by the Hobbesian view according to which the human condition has a 
natural inclination towards egoism, prevarication and violence. The looming violence of the 
social is therefore countered by hierarchies and centralisation: legal violence to combat 
social violence.  
Penal policy is an embodiment of this (a)social relation. In a similar vein, RJ when endorses 
processes of criminalisation, labelling, allocation of blame and dichotomisation of social 
relations, enacts the state. 
Additionally, to think of penal policy as a mere means to achieve a greater end (i.e. the wide 
and deep development of RJ, in terms of implementation, funding and capacity) is a 
dangerous illusion. As Walter Benjamin argued (1996), this instrumentalist logic is flawed, 
since the means re-shapes the end in the process, state violence systematically ‘gets out of 
hand’, ending up as a tool which uses the user (Butler, 2020: 14). The bureaucratisation and 
standardisation of RJ practices are well-known empirical examples of this dynamic (e.g. 
Crawford and Newburn, 2003; Blagg, 2017). 
There is an unbridgeable gap which separates the state from the radical core of RJ. The 
latter, in fact, embraces the indeterminacy of the social world, where conflicts do not need 
to be neutralised but nurtured and contextualised as a challenging opportunity to create 
new social and political obligations.  
A way forward, sideways  
How to practice a radical and sustainable RJ without accepting its incorporation into penal 
policy? How to disengage RJ from the state, in order to create a viable, non-violent and 
decentralised way of dealing with problematic situations, outside a juridical framework? 
How to address transgressions to people’s freedoms by presenting opportunities to rethink 
social relations and political obligations, instead of re-establishing predefined hierarchies 
rooted in social inequality (Newman, 2010: 23)? 
These questions would deserve a standalone meditation which cannot be conducted here, 
for limits of space. However, I do wish to offer a few considerations which dovetail with the 
foregoing critique, suggesting that it is possible to imagine the enfranchisement of RJ from 
the state as an ‘engaged withdrawing’ (Virno, 1996).  
Firstly, this involves a strategy for challenging ‘from within’ existing institutionalised RJ. RJ 
processes already ‘defined in’ criminal justice, should become spaces where facilitators 
support participants in reflecting upon the process of criminalisation instead of passively 




to contest the very institutional framework and underpinning values – i.e. the state – they 
are inserted into. This involves discussing commonalities and differences, challenges and 
constraints, both at individual and societal level, that parties experience in their pursuit of 
justice when their needs are obliterated or threatened. RJ should not just be a place where 
‘offenders’ give apologies and ‘victims’ receive space and time to vent their feelings (as 
policy seems to envision). Instead of this individualising strategy, RJ should allow 
possibilities for re-imagining forms of cohabitation, in non-violent and dialogical ways, 
whereby differentials of power – related e.g. to gender, race and socio-economic status – 
are openly addressed. 
The condition for taking this step is the further development of a self-critical consciousness 
within the RJ movement, that is, a steadier awareness of the dependency, conformism, 
instrumental character of the institutionalisation of RJ. In fact, although RJ scholars, 
advocates and practitioners who share radical values do exist, larger sections of the RJ 
movement advocate strongly for more laws and regulations instead of reflecting (and 
acting) on the toll to be paid when accepting the state. 
Then, the engaged withdrawal requires a bolder step. This implies investing entirely in 
restorative practices, that is, in RJ outside criminal justice. All the resources should be put 
in localised, informal and diffused networks of ‘doing justice’ according to values of de-
professionalisation, direct stakeholders’ centrality, cooperative-transformative approach to 
problematic situations and non-violence. No referrals from criminal justice gatekeepers, no 
schemes backed up by the threat of punishment, no professional facilitators, no 
government grants, no pre-set legal categories, no ‘success’ parameters based on criminal 
justice goals. Needless to say, this RJ should give up on grand plans of building mainstream 
systems (or ‘restorative criminal justice systems’). Enfranchising RJ from the state would 
require small and reversible steps, planning on surprises and on human inventiveness 
(Scott, 1998: 345). Such a process is in itself an embodiment of the radical values advocated 
above and therefore an immediate challenge to the standardised, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic nature of institutionalised RJ and more broadly to the state. 
Ostensibly, RJ ‘in the community’ could likewise end up endorsing and enforcing hierarchies 
and violence (cf. Cohen, 1985). Tendencies to self-institutionalise and to produce 
domination should be taken into account. More generally, it is naive to think that relations 
uncontaminated by any form of domination or completely peaceful practices will ever be 
crafted. The point, here, is not where justice practices are situated but how they ‘think’, 
which values they embody and what effects they engender. The goal is not imagining an 
unmediated relation with the social, but reflecting on which categories we use to make 
sense of human bonds whilst opening up new opportunities for doing justice bearing in 
mind the differential of powers among people. ‘Justice’, in fact, is always and only a 
normative horizon, a permanent doing, a ‘pure means’, to be constantly lived through, 
renewed and nurtured. 
To not conclude 
Both the critique and the ‘engaged withdrawal’ sketched out in this paper should not be 
taken as a counsel of despair. Instead, my point was to raise some untimely objections, in a 
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Nietzschean sense, that is, both contemporary and against their/our time. Too often, 
progressive social movements like RJ slowly dry up, strained by their own endorsement of 
state logic. We need new spaces for critical engagements with RJ, keeping alive its radical 
core. In short, ‘there’s no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons’ (Deleuze, 
1992: 4). 
From this perspective, I have outlined the risks integral to institutionalising RJ. The analysis 
of three different examples of incorporating RJ into penal policy – England and Wales, 
Norway and France – shows how this process obliterates the promises of de-
professionalisation, critique of punishment, direct stakeholders’ centrality and cooperative-
transformative approach to social conflicts and harms which constitute the radical core of 
RJ. In fact, within policy, RJ is expressed in the ‘conventional’ criminal justice language, 
excludes any progressive understanding of community, endorses the selective law 
enforcement performed by criminal justice gatekeepers, pushes toward the 
professionalisation of practitioners, whilst widening the net of crime control in a way which 
entails the threat of punishment. 
The radical values of RJ are incompatible with penal policy and therefore with any type of 
criminal justice system. This means, on one hand, that there is no ‘better’ penal policy which 
will ever embody any radical value and, on the other, that a ‘penalised’ RJ will always be an 
expression, however subtle, of hegemonic criminal justice. The root of this incompatibility 
is ontological: it pertains to the nature of penal policy, and namely to the way it parcels out 
the social world through fixed oppositions and abstract narratives that are informed by an 
aversion to social indeterminacy and conflict. This normative perspective – ‘the state’ – aims 
to make the social world legible in order to control it from the outside. It follows that the 
radical values of RJ are sterilised by the fact of having the recognition of the state imposed 
upon, in the form of penal policy. In the final pages I have sketched out the idea of an 
‘engaged withdrawal’ from the state as a possible way to cultivate those radical values. 
Social conflict and indeterminacy are not a threat to be exorcised by the use of pre-set 
identities. The lack of ‘one size fits all’ approaches and solutions does not equate with moral 
confusion, but with an opportunity to embrace an endless ethical and political challenge: 
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Criminal Justice Act 2003 
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Loi n° 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d'innocence et 
les droits des victimes (‘Law reinforcing the protection of the presumption of innocence and 
the victims’ rights’) 
Loi n° 2014-896 du 15 août 2014 relative à l'individualisation des peines et renforçant 
l'efficacité des sanctions pénales (‘Law on the individualisation of punishment and 
strengthening the effectiveness of penal sanctions’) 
Code de procédure pénale (consolidated to 20/03/2020) (‘Code of Penal Proceedings’) 
Code pénal (consolidated to 20/03/2020) (‘Penal Code’) 
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